INDIA PLAYS THE TAIWAN CARD - By: C. Raja Mohan

China has had an easy ride with India, especially concerning Arunachal Pradesh boundary
negotiations, but as New Delhi plays the Taiwan card, Beijing’s ride may rougher.

AMID growing irritation with China on territorial questions, India signaled that it had diplomatic options for Taiwan that might not be comfortable for Beijing. Both New Delhi and Taipei deny that the visit of Ma Ying-Jeou, Taiwanese opposition leader and presidential candidate of the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) has anything to do with Sino-Indian relations.

There is no doubt, however, that Ma’s visit the first since KMT leader Chiang Kai-shek visited India in 1942, arks a deliberate but subtle shift in India’s hitherto rigid “One Chi-na” policy. Neither its border war with China in 1962 nor its grievances against Beijing’s enduring strategic partnership with Islamabad shook India’s unwavering commitment to the “One China” policy.

After India established unofficial ties with Taiwan in 1992, New Delhi remained ultra cautious in its relationship with Taipei. Senior officials and political leaders were bar-red from visiting Taiwan even in their private capacity, and Taipei’s trade office in New Delhi was forced to operate under severe restrictions.

While other major powers and Southeast Asian nations pursued a pragmatic engage-ment with Taiwan within the rubric of a “One China” policy, New Delhi seemed hesitant to embark on cooperative ventures with Taipei.

The change in New Delhi’s Taiwan policy coincides with Beijing’s hardening attitude on the boundary negotiations and a harsh re-affirmation of its sove-reignty over Arunachal Pradesh, an Indian province on the North Eastern frontier with China.

In resuming the boundary talks with China at a political level at the end of 2003, India hoped that Beijing would accept a pragmatic settlement around the current territorial status quo on their contested border that runs along the Great Himalayas. Beijing, insisted on substantive Indian territorial concessions in Arunachal Pradesh.

India has also been surprised by a seeming reversal of Bei-jing’s promise not to press for exchange of territories that have settled populations. This broad principle was codified in an agreement on political para-meters for the resolution of the boundary dispute signed by Indian Prime Minister Manmo-han Sign and Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao in April 2005.

In the recent rounds of negotiations, Beijing has demanded that India hand over the Tawang tract in Arunachal Pradesh, which is home to an ancient Buddhist monastery and hosts the birthplace of the Sixth Dalai Lama. Despite the proclaimed political commit-ment to resolve the boundary dispute at an early date and the increased frequency of recent consultations, the negotiations seem to be deadlocked.

Worse still, China has gone to extraordinary lengths in recent months in affirming its claims on Arunachal Pradesh. On the eve of President Hu Jintao’s visit to India last Nov-ember, Beijing’s ambassador to New Delhi, Sun Yuxi, claimed in a TV interview that the entire state of Arunachal Pradesh belonged to China.

Recently, China refused to grant a visa to an Indian official who was part of a prestigious civil service delegation of more than 100 members. Beijing ar-gued that the official was from Arunachal Pradesh, and hence a citizen of China and did not require a visa. India reacted sharply by canceling the visit of the entire delegation.

China’s public posturing on Arunachal Pradesh has begun to stoke the dying embers of Sinophobia in India. Amid a galloping bilateral trade, exp-ected to reach US$50 billion by 2010, and increasing people to people contact, a new generation of Indian leaders seemed ready to overcome the past passions on the territorial disputes with China.

New Delhi’s decision to host Ma appears to be a calibrated decision to caution Beijing against pushing too hard on its territorial claims. India is also suggesting China should not take India’s extraordinary res-traint on Taiwan for granted.

In New Delhi recently, Ma did not meet any top government leaders, but had interaction with the leaders of the ruling Congress Party and the opposition Bharatiya Janata Party. He also spoke to the Indian intelligentsia on a platform funded by the Foreign Office.

For now, India’s hospitality to Ma remains below the threshold of Beijing’s tolerance. Unlike the controversial current president of Taiwan, Chan Shui-bian, Ma is not in favour of Taiwan’s independence.

New Delhi’s outreach to the KMT after nearly six and a half decades, however, indicates New Delhi is geared up for a stronger relationship with Taiwan. Uring his visit to New Delhi, Ma pointed to the huge complementarity between Taiwan’s powerful computer hardware industry and India’s software strengths. He also underlined Taiwan’s ability to bring advanced agricultural technologies into India and the immense prospects for investments by Taiwanese firms.

Beijing is unlikely to object expanding economic and commercial relationship between India and Taiwan. However, it would closely monitor the potential expansion of a political and security relationship between New Delhi and Taipei.

Any talk of shared political values between India and Taiwan is bound to make Beijing nervous. Ma argued that Indian democracy built around the principle of “unity in diversity” offers a “role model” for future political reconciliation between China and Taiwan.

China has already expressed strong concerns about Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s proposal for greater cooperation among Asian democracies.

Recently, Beijing protested against a formal meeting between the senior officials of the US, Japan, India and Australia among Asian democracies.

China has been watching with some anxiety India’s expanding defence cooperation with Washington and Tokyo, and has noted the first joint naval exercises between the US, Japan and India held last April in the Pacific Ocean.

Until now, China has had an easy ride with India. It has successfully expanded relations with India without yielding an inch on the boundary negotiations. By putting the Taiwan card on the table, New Delhi is hinting that China will have to begin take into account the political costs of a hard-line on the boundary dispute.

If Beijing has traditionally underestimated India’s power potential in general and New Delhi’s ability to act as a spoiler in East Asia, it might now have good reasons to rethink.

(Courtesy: ISN Security Watch - 18th JUNE,2007)